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ABSTRACT | Throughout the twenty-first century, El Salvador has been immersed in a crisis of armed violence, 
largely explained by an exceptionally high degree of organization of armed violence by three gangs, the police, 
and the armed forces. I trace the processes of organization and escalation of armed violence in the country, 
and address the potential for harnessing these organizations to constrain armed violence, as evidenced twice 
in the past decade, when gangs reined in the wars between them and reduced homicides by half. I analyze the 
organizational conditions that make this possible and the political conditions necessary to bridge short-term 
violence reduction and a long-term political vision and policy framework for social transformation.
KEYWORDS | Armed violence; El Salvador; gangs; homicide reduction; politics of violence; state violence
¿El vaso medio lleno? El peligro y potencial de la violencia altamente organizada
RESUMEN | A lo largo del siglo XXI, El Salvador se ha visto inmerso en una crisis de violencia armada, cuya 
principal explicación es el grado excepcionalmente alto de organización de la violencia armada por parte de 
tres pandillas, la policía y la fuerza armada. Rastreo los procesos de organización y escalada de violencia armada 
en el país, e interrogo el potencial de movilizar estas organizaciones para contener la violencia armada, como 
ha quedado evidenciado en dos ocasiones en la última década, cuando las pandillas se dispusieron a parar 
sus guerras y reducir los homicidios a la mitad. Analizo las condiciones organizativas que hacen posible esa 
contención, así como las condiciones políticas necesarias para vincular una reducción de violencia a corto plazo 
con una visión política y con un marco de políticas públicas de transformación social a largo plazo.
PALABRAS CLAVE | El Salvador; pandillas; política de violencia; reducción de homicidios; violencia armada; 
violencia estatal
O copo meio cheio? O perigo e o potencial da violência altamente organizada
RESUMO | Ao longo do século XXI, El Salvador tem sido visto imerso em uma crise de violência armada, cuja 
principal explicação é o grau excepcionalmente alto de organização da violência armada por parte de três 
quadrilhas, da polícia e da força armada. Investigo os processos de organização e escalada de violência armada 
no país, e interrogo o potencial de mobilizar essas organizações para conter a violência armada, como ficou 
evidenciado em duas ocasiões na última década, quando as quadrilhas foram dispostas a parar suas guerras e 
reduzir os homicídios pela metade. Analiso as condições organizacionais que tornam possível essa contenção, 
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Introduction
Over the past decades, homicide rates in Latin America 
and the Caribbean have risen while poverty and income 
inequality have dropped, and the middle class and 
gross domestic products have grown (Chioda 2017, 7). 
Nevertheless, this is the world region with the highest 
homicide rate proportional to the population, and the 
only region where the rate is rising. Addressing this 
apparent clash with conventional wisdom, in its 2019 
Global Study on Homicide, the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime found that,
In Europe and Asia, the different levels of socioeco-
nomic development across countries explain their 
different homicide rates reasonably well; therefore, 
development policies in such countries are likely to 
be beneficial in terms of violence reduction. This is in 
contrast to Latin American countries experiencing 
elevated homicide rates that cannot be explained 
by their level of socioeconomic development alone. 
In such cases, investment in socioeconomic devel-
opment would not be sufficient to bring down the 
high level of violence. (UNODC 2019a, 36-37)
Even so, while research on violence in Latin America 
and the Caribbean is widespread, far less effort has 
been made to understand experiences of violence 
reduction (Hoelscher and Nussio 2016, 2399). Seeking 
to better understand experiences with both violence 
and violence reduction, here, I focus on El Salvador, a 
country that, between 2000 and 2017, recorded the 
highest mean (63), median (62), and maximum (105) rate 
of homicide victims per 100,000 inhabitants out of 144 
countries in the world with over one million inhabi-
tants. Figure 1 shows the Latin American and Caribbean 
countries in this sample and reveals that El Salvador is 
an extreme case within an extreme region.
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Source: Elaboration by the author with data from UNODC (2019b).
bem como as condições políticas necessárias para vincular uma redução de violência em curto prazo com uma 
visão política e com um referencial de políticas públicas de transformação social em longo prazo.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE | El Salvador; política de violência; quadrilhas; redução de homicídios; violência armada; 
violência estatal
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To explain the soaring homicide levels in several Latin 
American and Caribbean societies, I argue that it is cru-
cial to study the degree of organization of armed violence 
and, again, El Salvador is a radical case in point. Unlike 
countries such as Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico, where 
the armed actors are numerous, in El Salvador, armed 
violence is largely exercised by three gangs, the police, 
and the armed forces, who together account for the 
lion’s share of the 39,060 homicides registered between 
2010 and 2019, in a country of 6.5 million people. From 
2014 onward, the gang wars have been compounded by 
the government’s war on gangs, which has served to 
escalate the dynamics of armed violence in the country 
and silence the alternatives to the use of force.
As I unpack this case study, I am concerned not only 
with the conditions that enable and constrain armed 
violence in the first place, but with how armed vio-
lence itself transforms those conditions over time. 
This, I argue, is critical, in that it implies that armed 
violence transforms the conditions for its own reduc-
tion. In the first part of the article, I lay out a simple 
framework for analyzing organization and escala-
tion in armed conflict, followed by an analysis of the 
increasing organization of armed violence in El Salva-
dor, the recent escalation of violence between gangs, 
on the one hand, and police and armed forces on the 
other, and how these developments have served to 
transform the conditions for violence reduction. In the 
second part, I start by addressing the two most signif-
icant reductions in armed violence in El Salvador over 
the past decade, both of which saw gangs take leading 
roles, before analyzing the organizational conditions 
that made this possible, the political conditions that 
made it unsustainable, and the implications for vio-
lence reduction moving forward. Throughout, I engage 
extensively with other cases across Latin America and 
the Caribbean.
Organization and Escalation  
of Armed Violence
Reviews of the literature reveal an abundance of stud-
ies that cover cultural, economic, political, and social 
approaches to explain violence in El Salvador and Cen-
tral America (Yashar 2018; Zinecker 2017), and albeit 
each of the explanations are insufficient to fully account 
for variation in armed violence within and across coun-
tries, they contribute to and are indeed necessary parts 
of a comprehensive explanation (Rivera 2016). While 
there is consensus that much of the armed violence 
in the region is organized, chiefly by gangs, the theo-
retical and practical implications of such a degree of 
organization for the dynamics of violence, as well as 
for violence reduction, have not been dealt with. Here, I 
seek to address this gap through a processual and rela-
tional approach.
Firstly, when I interrogate how, over time, armed 
violence transforms the conditions that enable and 
constrain it, I am preoccupied with processes. Following 
Stefan Malthaner (2017, 2-3), “While process trajectories 
are influenced by (and to some extent depend on) envi-
ronmental conditions and individual predispositions at 
the outset, they are driven and shaped by dynamics that 
they themselves generate, thereby transforming initial 
conditions and generating new goals and motives (della 
Porta 2013; Kalyvas 2006; Neidhardt 1981; von Trotha 
1997; Wood 2003).” While the fields of conflict transfor-
mation and peace building tend to emphasize the “roots” 
of violence, violence ought also be considered in its own 
right (Pearce 2020). Specifically, I posit that processes of 
large-scale armed violence can garner a momentum of 
their own which needs to be addressed directly.
Moreover, process tracing is helpful in demonstrating 
that present conditions are the result of “a sequence of 
events, some of which foreclose certain paths in the 
development and steer the outcome in other directions” 
(George and Bennett 2005, 212). This is one of the ways 
in which violence can work as an independent variable. 
Below, I argue that the escalation of armed violence 
between Salvadoran gangs and the Salvadoran state 
has progressively narrowed their repertoires of action 
so as to rule out forms of nonviolent engagement.
Secondly, I focus my analysis on the relationship between 
gangs and governments in El Salvador, rather than on 
any one of the actors. Specifically, I am concerned with 
the inter-organizational processes between gangs and 
governments that enable and constrain armed violence 
(Tilly 2003, 20). This implies the need for interpretation 
of the actors’ behaviors. On the one hand, organiza-
tions may act (violently) with intent to generate a given 
effect—what Malthaner (2017, 3) refers to as “strategic 
interaction.” On the other, organizations may act (vio-
lently) in response to the acts of other organizations—as 
“mutual adaptation in tactics and repertoires of action” 
(Malthaner 2017, 3). Usually, non-state armed actors 
are understood to exercise violence with intent, be it 
in El Salvador (Cruz and Durán-Martínez 2016; Yashar 
2018) or elsewhere in Latin America and the Caribbean 
(Kalyvas 2015; Koonings and Kruijt 2004; Lessing 2015). 
Of course, in practice, acts of violence are likely to be 
shaped by a mix of intent and response, and this tension 
runs throughout the processes that I deal with below.
The study is based on my ongoing longitudinal research 
in El Salvador and Central America, which began in 
2008, on the organization of armed violence, gangs, and 
opportunities for violence reduction, conflict trans-
formation, and peace building. I draw upon extensive 
press reviews, participant observation, and countless 
interviews, as well as raw data from Salvadoran police 
databases and public information from the institute of 
forensic medicine.
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Organizing Armed Violence
Over the past twenty years, armed violence in El Sal-
vador has increased, to the point where, in 2015, one 
in every 970 Salvadorans was murdered—the highest 
rate of homicides per inhabitant in the twenty-first 
century of any country in the world with more than 
one million people. This increase is inextricably tied to 
the uniquely high degree of organization of armed vio-
lence in the country, chiefly by three gangs, the police, 
and the armed forces. While there is a long tradition 
of gangs in El Salvador (Savenije 2009), the gang wars 
of the 1990s and early 2000s led to a convergence of 
dozens of small gangs into two large federations: the 
18th Street (18th St.) and the Mara Salvatrucha 13 (MS13), 
with the former splitting into two rival gangs in 2005, 
the 18th St. Revolutionaries and the 18th St. Southerners 
(Amaya and Martínez 2015). Only a few smaller gangs 
persist today (Amaya and Martínez 2014).
As shown in Figure 2, this degree of organization leads 
not only to generally high levels of homicide throughout 
the past twenty years, but to extreme variation, specifi-
cally in the number of women and especially men killed 
by firearm. In contrast, the number of homicides by 
other means remains relatively stable. Presumably, the 
former owes largely to gang wars and the war on gangs, 
while the latter are better explained by a wider range 
of dynamics (Hume 2009; Zinecker 2017), with gender 
playing a major role across the board (Applebaum and 
Mawby 2018; Hume and Wilding 2015; Rojas Ospina 
2020; Walsh and Menjívar 2016; Zulver 2016).
Unlike the armed violence of the 1980-1992 war, which 
was readily recognized as “political,” the armed vio-
lence of the postwar period is broadly understood as 
“criminal” (Bergmann 2015; Moodie 2010), in line with 
a discursive shift that reaches across Latin America and 
the Caribbean (Imbusch, Misse, and Carrión 2011, 96). 
Crucially, this reframing shapes not only how violence 
is understood, but how it is acted upon: While politi-
cal violence may be subject to dialog, mediation, and 
negotiation so as to build political solutions, criminal 
violence is generally referred to the law enforcement 
and criminal justice systems.
Predictably, El Salvador’s predominantly repressive law 
enforcement and criminal justice policies have been 
incapable of sustainably reducing armed violence or 
fostering urgent social transformations (Holland 2013; 
Wolf 2017). Instead, El Salvador has transformed into a 
mass incarceration society, warping from 132 prisoners 
per 100,000 inhabitants in 2000 to 604 in 2018, second 
in the world only to the United States (Walmsley 2018, 
6). What is more, this mass incarceration has played a 
central role in strengthening Salvadoran gangs orga-
nizationally. As the prison population swelled, prison 
authorities started to separate inmates by gang affilia-
tion as of September 2, 2004 (Valencia 2014), and while 
this helped reduce inter-gang fighting within prisons 
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Source: Elaboration by the author with data from Instituto de Medicina Legal, UAIP/2788/RR/195/2018(2) and UAIP/4/
RAdm/20/2020(5) (San Salvador: Corte Suprema de Justicia).
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(Peirce and Fondevila 2020), it also brought members of 
the same gang together from across the country in a 
way that had never happened before and that the gangs 
would have been unable to do on their own. Through 
case studies of California, El Salvador, and São Paulo, 
Benjamin Lessing (2017, 257) shows how such “mass-in-
carceration policies, while incapacitating and deterring 
individual criminals, can simultaneously strengthen 
collective criminal networks.” In effect, mass incarcer-
ation paved the way for Salvadoran gangs to develop 
cohesive organizations with a national reach, both on 
the streets and across the prison system.
Countless times, Salvadorans have witnessed the 
harrowing potential that comes with this degree of 
organization of armed violence. The most extreme 
expression came in August 2015, when 918 people were 
killed, up from 470 in July. To put it crudely, murder at 
such a rate takes work—as well as a degree of logistics 
and supplies, not least of firearms, ammunition, and 
people willing and able to use them. The bloodshed of 
August was foreshadowed by the murders of eleven 
bus workers and torching of several buses in late July, 
which spurred a five-day halt in bus services, out of fear 
of more attacks, disrupting daily life across much of the 
country (Dalton 2015). Campaigns of armed violence 
like this have not only generated frenzied tensions, but 
also shaped the ideas that policymakers and the public 
hold about how El Salvador’s gangs may and may not, 
should and should not, be dealt with. Overwhelmingly, 
the effect on government policy has been to entrench 
and radicalize repressive strategies.
Escalating Armed Violence
In the wake of the 1992 peace accord, a series of 
reforms sought to constrain state violence in El Salva-
dor (Holden 1996), indeed aspiring to break with a long 
legacy of military dictatorship and widespread repres-
sion (Stanley 1996). The armed forces were scaled back 
and their political influence tempered, the judiciary was 
overhauled, and a new civilian police force substituted 
the three military police forces of the past (Williams 
and Walter 1997), yet the development of democratic 
institutions and practices was slow and contradictory 
(Call 2003; Wade 2016). When El Salvador’s first leftist 
government assumed power under President Mauricio 
Funes in 2009, there were hopes and efforts to turn 
a corner after years of failed public security policies 
(Hoppert-Flämig 2013; van der Borgh and Savenije 
2015). However, fledgling attempts to consolidate the 
rule of law gave way to significant rollbacks during the 
left’s second term in power, from 2014 to 2019, includ-
ing a massive expansion of the limits on state violence. 
Numerous incidents fed into this evolution, but one 
stands out for its long-term repercussions.
In the early hours of March 3, 2016, eleven men were 
brutally killed by members of the 18th St. Revolution-
aries in San Juan Opico, an hour’s drive northwest of 
the capital. Some of the victims had suffered prolonged 
torture and the massacre spurred massive public out-
rage and debates over declaring a state of exception. 
Eventually, a package of “extraordinary measures” was 
passed into law on April 1 and later denounced by the 
United Nations high commissioner for human rights, 
Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein (2017), for having “placed thou-
sands of people in prolonged and isolated detention 
under truly inhumane conditions, and with prolonged 
suspension of family visits.” New special forces units, 
comprised of thousands of police and military person-
nel, were also set up and deployed in the weeks that 
followed (Salazar 2016).
Within days of the massacre, President Salvador 
Sánchez Cerén—flanked by the minister of justice and 
public security, Mauricio Ramírez Landaverde, and the 
director general of the police, Howard Cotto—charged 
that, “although some say we are at war, there is no other 
way. There is no space for dialog, no space for truces, 
no space for reaching an understanding with them; they 
are criminals and must be treated as criminals” (Rauda 
Zablah 2016). Vice President Óscar Ortiz followed suit, 
avowing that, “now, no option is left to us but confron-
tation” (Calderón 2016).
Sánchez Cerén, Ortiz, Ramírez Landaverde, and Cotto 
formed the hard core of the tight-knit group of former 
guerrilla members that controlled law enforcement and 
criminal justice policy during most of the 2014-2019 presi-
dency. By early 2016, critical voices within the government 
had largely been sidelined and the policy disagreements 
that characterized the Funes presidency were substituted 
by a shared outlook, as my interviews with Ramírez Lan-
daverde, Cotto, and others close to them make clear. As 
one senior policymaker told me, “now, they [the gangs] 
have gone too far,” with the implication that a ramping 
up of repressive measures was the only path left open to 
them. In turn, the use of lethal force by law enforcement 
officers became a key driver of the dynamics of armed 
violence in the country (Bergmann 2019).
As reflected in Figure 3, during the Sánchez Cerén pres-
idency, from June 2014 to May 2019, 1,819 Salvadorans 
were killed by police and military personnel, allegedly 
in the line of duty—a third of them in 2016 alone. In 
February 2017, the percentage of overall homicides 
owed to state violence, peaked at a whopping 22 per-
cent and, after her mission to El Salvador in early 2018, 
the United Nations special rapporteur on extrajudicial, 
summary, or arbitrary executions, Agnès Callamard 
(2018, paragraph 36), reported that she “found a pat-
tern of behavior among security personnel amounting 
to extrajudicial executions and excessive use of force, 
nurtured and aggravated by very weak institutional 
responses.”
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Figure 3. Homicides by and of law enforcement officers in El 
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Source: Elaboration by the author with data from police 
databases “Estadística” for 2011-2015 and “Imperium” for 
2016-2019 (San Salvador: Policía Nacional Civil).
The victims of state violence included gang members 
and non-gang members, almost all men, mostly very 
young—some only thirteen years old. One woman in 
her forties told me: “The problem isn’t with the guys 
[gang members]; we know how to get along with them. 
The problem is with the police.” Over the past years, 
I have heard variations of this statement in several 
communities.
Meanwhile, under Sánchez Cerén, 355 police and mil-
itary personnel were murdered in El Salvador, also 
reflected in Figure 3. An undetermined portion of 
these deaths were unrelated to the victims’ profes-
sional capacity—drunken brawls, jealousy, debts and, 
indeed, criminal activity in which they were them-
selves involved. Most, though, will have been targeted 
by the gangs. Whatever the motive, overwhelmingly, 
the victims were off duty at the time of their death—74 
percent of police and 87 percent of military personnel. 
When on duty, they usually have a sweeping tactical 
advantage—in terms of numbers, training, communica-
tions capabilities, and equipment including bullet proof 
vests and high-power firearms—making them difficult 
targets. As such, the majority of targeted killings of law 
enforcement officers and their family members have 
taken place in or near their own homes, implying that 
the fear of being targeted permeates their professional 
and personal lives alike.
Transforming the Conditions  
for Violence Reduction
Whereas the predominant discourse in Salvadoran 
politics and press squarely blames the gangs for the 
country’s crisis of armed violence (Carballo 2017; Wolf 
2012), an alternative but complementary view empha-
sizes the role of public policy and state actors, and is 
widespread in academia and the human rights commu-
nity. Meanwhile, a focus on the relationship between 
the gangs and the state highlights Randall Collins’ 
(2009, 20) argument that “escalation and counter-esca-
lation are a process of feedback loops.”
In light of the above, the best explanation for the dra-
matic expansion of limits on state violence in El Salvador 
may be “that once certain practices get up and running, 
they carry an autonomous momentum that can be dif-
ficult to divert. Certain practices become the accepted 
norm; they become ingrained into the cultural and social 
milieu, such that political actors simply could not con-
ceive of the world working any other way” (Ching 2013, 
27). In their study of large-scale use and abuse of force by 
law enforcement officers in Venezuela, Andrés Antillano 
and Keymer Ávila make a similar finding: “Rather than 
a consistent, rational, and explicit policy, it approaches 
the notion of apparatus put forth by Foucault (1980, 194): 
A set of practices, discourses, institutional dispositions, 
regulations, and collective initiatives that take on con-
sistency by way of their strategic usage” (2017, 86).
While individual acts of violence—be it the torture of 
a young man at the hands of a group of police officers 
or the dismemberment of a police officer at the hands 
of a group of gang members—are intentional (if not 
necessarily planned or wished for), the cumulative, 
broad escalation of violence over time has not been the 
intention or in the interest of neither gangs nor gov-
ernments. What is more, the war between them may 
have come about less by design, and more as the result 
of a tragic spiral of mutual adaptations to tactics and 
repertoires of action.
In either case, the broader effect of the escalation 
of violence is to take any nonviolent strategies for 
engagement off the table. Even years before the radi-
calization of state violence under Sánchez Cerén, Mo 
Hume stressed that “police brutality, summary ‘justice’ 
and revenge killings … should be contextualized as 
an endpoint in a broader continuity of exclusion and 
polarization, not as something outside normal social 
relations. They are indicative of the endurance of a 
hegemonic political project that continues to silence 
alternatives to the use of force” (2009, 9).
While this project has continued to build strength, 
the most encouraging experiences of the reduction of 
armed violence in El Salvador over the past decade have 
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gone against the grain. Not only have they involved 
nonviolent engagement with gangs, but indeed they 
have relied on Salvadoran gangs’ ability to mobilize their 
organization of armed violence so as to constrain it.
Deescalating Armed Violence
The same organization of armed violence in El Salvador 
that produced a peak of 918 homicides in August 2015, 
produced a low of 120 homicides in December 2019 and 
65 under pandemic lockdown measures in March 2020. 
Two experiences stand out as forceful expressions of 
the potential for gangs themselves to take a lead in 
processes of armed violence reduction, as well as the 
controversy this entails (Cruz and Durán-Martínez 
2016; Kan 2014; Schuberth 2016).
First, in 2012-2013, a truce reigned among El Salvador’s 
main gangs, with crucial operational support from the 
government. The process brought about an instant, 
major reduction in the number of homicides—57 per-
cent when comparing three months before and after it 
came into effect on March 8, 2012, 56 percent over six 
months, and 53 percent over twelve months. Indeed, 
the gang truce ensured the lowest rate of homicides 
since before the war started in 1980 and spurred sig-
nificant international interest among scholars and 
practitioners. As the erstwhile minister of justice and 
public security, David Munguía Payés, put it to me in an 
interview, it was a clear demonstration that “whoever 
controls the war between the gangs, controls the homi-
cides” (San Salvador, November 13, 2018). However, 
while the gangs remained committed to the process, it 
gradually broke down as government support dried up 
in the latter half of 2013 and into the elections of early 
2014 (van der Borgh and Savenije 2019).
Second, as mentioned above, on March 3, 2016, members 
of the 18th St. Revolutionaries killed eleven people in San 
Juan Opico, paving the way for a package of extraordinary 
measures to be implemented across the prison system, 
and for new special forces units to be formed. Subse-
quently, the government maintained that it was those 
repressive policies that led to a decrease in armed vio-
lence, while the case has not previously been addressed 
by scholars. However, a sharp homicide reduction set in 
a week before the extraordinary measures were even 
voted upon by legislators, much less in effect, when, on 
March 26, the MS13, the 18th St. Revolutionaries, and the 
18th St. Southerners announced a “unilateral ceasefire” 
(Valencia and Martínez 2016). On the one hand, key gang 
leaders had sought to bring about a truce ever since the 
previous one imploded. On the other, it was an attempt 
to temper the fallout from the recent massacre. Over 
the months that followed, the gangs worked together to 
restrain armed violence (Martínez 2016b) and homicides 
were indeed reduced by 50 percent over three months, 
43 percent over six months, and 46 percent over twelve 
months before and after March 26.
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Source: Elaboration by the author with data from Instituto de Medicina Legal, UAIP/2788/RR/195/2018(2) (San Salvador: 
Corte Suprema de Justicia).
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Figure 4 reflects the scale, but not least the speed of the 
homicide reductions in the wake of the 2012 and 2016 
gang truces. In both instances, the reductions took 
place literally from one day to the next, and neither 
the scale nor the speed can be reasonably explained 
without accounting for an exceptionally high degree 
of organization of armed violence; that is, there is no 
plausible alternative explanation to the gang truces. 
A corresponding level of control may be found at the 
subnational level in several Latin American and Carib-
bean countries, not least in some cities, including parts 
of São Paulo (Biderman et al. 2019; Feltran 2012; Manso 
2016; Willis 2015) and Medellín (Acemoglu, Robinson, 
and Santos 2013; Cruz and Durán-Martínez 2016; Doyle 
2019; Moncada 2016b), but not on a national scale, like 
in El Salvador.
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that a similar effect was 
achieved under opposite political circumstances: In the 
first case, the Funes government supported a mediation 
team, improved prison conditions, and provided gang 
leaders with the communications capabilities neces-
sary for them to direct the gang truce. In the latter, 
the Sánchez Cerén government sustained a fierce anti-
gang campaign in prisons and on the streets, with the 
traditional gang leaders isolated in the maximum-secu-
rity prison. Still, the gangs agreed upon and enforced a 
reduction in armed violence and developed mechanisms 
to manage disputes between them and to discipline 
members within each.
A third case in point is playing out under the govern-
ment of President Nayib Bukele, inaugurated on June 
1, 2019, with homicides dropping by 53 percent over 
three months and 52 percent over six months before 
and after July 6, 2019, when the reduction seems to have 
commenced. Little is yet known about this endeavor, 
but my off-the-record conversations with knowledge-
able individuals inside and outside of government and 
gangs suggest that the gangs have again taken the 
initiative to reduce homicides. Rather than a negotia-
tion between government and gangs, it may have to do 
with an alignment of interests, as all parties are keen to 
generate the conditions for a shift away from endless 
war. Moreover, it underscores that Salvadoran gangs’ 
repertoires of action have now expanded to encompass 
everything from breathtaking campaigns of systematic 
killing to sober political strategizing.
Violence Reduction as an Organizational 
Project
The 2012 and 2016 gang truces both fell short of devel-
oping comprehensive, durable solutions to armed 
violence and social conflicts in El Salvador, yet their 
accomplishments warrant an earnest effort to explain 
the conditions for their successes and failures, and 
two crucial conditions stand out—one because of its 
presence and the other because of its absence: Firstly, 
the existence of cohesive organizations capable of com-
mitting to and delivering on agreed change processes 
and, secondly, the development of a cohesive political 
project capable of bridging responses to immediate and 
emerging crises, including violence reduction, and a 
long-term vision for social transformation (Lederach 
2012). I address the latter point in the next section.
My emphasis on the role of organization springs from 
an acknowledgment of what Anthony Giddens’ (1986, 
25) labeled the “duality of structure”—namely that 
social structures at once enable and constrain social 
action. Correspondingly, social structures such as 
gangs, police, and armed forces can be harnessed both 
to enable and to constrain armed violence, and this is 
the point where the armed violence of the postwar era 
intersects with the armed violence of the war: Not in its 
political content, but in its degree of organization. This 
is a parallel fraught with controversy, to the extent 
that it may be misinterpreted as casting the guerrilla in 
the same moral category as gangs. However, the logic 
is straightforward: In 1992, a group of guerrilla com-
manders and military generals were able to bring the 
war to an end. Today, a group of national gang leaders 
and a handful of government officials can do the same.
Then as now, an organization’s degree of fragmentation 
or consolidation influences its ability to regulate vio-
lence. For instance, under the 2006-2012 presidency of 
Felipe Calderón, the Mexican state set out to “dismantl[e] 
criminal organizations by dismantling their leadership 
structures in order to fragment them into minor and 
more manageable groups.” However, Octavio Rodrí-
guez (2016, 43) warns that “this ‘strategy’ intensified 
pre-existing conflicts and generated others by creat-
ing smaller, less predictable, and more violent groups 
fighting fiercely for smaller turfs.” Equivalent strategies 
have been adopted throughout the region, from Brazil 
to Guatemala, with similar effects: Generally, greater 
fragmentation of armed organizations tends to lead to 
greater competition among them, which in turn tends 
to lead to more violence (Durán-Martínez 2018, 18-19).
The perils of fragmentation notwithstanding, Salva-
doran police and prosecutors have also been influenced 
by this approach to law enforcement, reflected in the 
increased targeting of the gangs’ finances and chains 
of command, principally striking the MS13 and most 
significantly through operations Jaque, Tecana, and 
Cuscatlán in 2016, 2017, and 2018, respectively (Martínez 
2018a). Notably, during the 2012 gang truce, the Salva-
doran government not only desisted from systematic 
attempts to fragment the gangs and break down their 
leadership structures; effectively, the government threw 
its lot in with those gang leaders who were committed to 
reducing homicides and carving out a new path for their 
organizations. However, the best of intentions and ear-
nest efforts do not make up for the absence of the kind 
39D O S S I E R
Glass Half Full? The Peril and Potential of Highly Organized Violence | Adrian Bergmann 
of transformative politics that both helps make sense of 
and go beyond reductions in armed violence.
Violence Reduction as a Political Project
While cohesive organizations that are able and com-
mitted to deliver on agreements can reduce armed 
violence, a cohesive political project—that is, a clear 
political vision and a sound policy framework—is nec-
essary to forge broader processes of transformation 
and provide them with direction, content, and legit-
imacy. Kristian Hoelscher and Enzo Nussio find that, 
“while micro-level policy interventions may be suited 
to explain short-term reduction in urban criminality, 
sustained decreases in lethal violence may be more 
likely in situations where policy changes complement, 
or are integrated into, wider reforms to political and 
social institutions” (2016, 2399).
Across Latin America and the Caribbean, Bogotá, Cali, 
and Medellín in Colombia are held up as success stories 
of reduction of armed violence to be emulated (Maclean 
2015; Moncada 2016b). While emphasis is commonly 
placed on a series of innovations in public spaces and 
services, including transportation, parks, and librar-
ies, Francisco Gutiérrez et al. (2013, 3136) stress that 
“the ‘miracles’ [of Bogotá, Cali, and Medellín] cannot be 
understood without dealing with urban politics and in 
particular with the ability of innovative politicians to 
successfully create viable transformational coalitions 
within the city.” That is, the differences in conditions 
and policies between cities notwithstanding, the 
mayors broke with ingrained political polarization to 
develop more inclusive visions of the cities and cultivate 
the social support necessary to sustain them, including 
from the media and business sectors (Moncada 2016a).
Quite the contrary, the Funes government failed to 
imbue the 2012 gang truce with either a political vision 
or support from crucial social actors (Cruz 2018; Roque 
2017; van der Borgh and Savenije 2019). While the gang 
leaders and the mediation team kept the violence reduc-
tion process going, and isolated initiatives for alternative 
livelihood strategies and community development were 
rolled out (Rivard Piché 2017; Pries 2015), the budding 
peace process never matured into a coherent public pol-
icy framework, never mind a viable political platform. In 
this vein, Achim Wennmann argues that the thousands 
of lives that were spared are “a testament to the pos-
itive achievements of dialogue and negotiation in one 
of the most crime- and violence-affected regions of the 
world.” However, he adds, “El Salvador’s gang truce also 
highlights that, for such processes to be sustainable, 
they must be embedded in broader social and political 
transformation processes” (2014, 269).
In the years since, the political failure of the 2012 
gang truce has severely complicated the prospects for 
renewed nonviolent engagement with gangs, as critics 
hold up the eventual unraveling of the past process as 
proof that any such approach is unfeasible. Moreover, 
the experience has been dragged through the mud by 
unsubstantiated claims that the gangs took advantage 
to better arm themselves, develop strong links to 
Mexican drug trafficking organizations, and substitute 
homicides for forced disappearances (Carcach and Arto-
la 2016; Farah 2012). Along with the horrifying spike 
in armed violence in subsequent years, these accusa-
tions have made nonviolent engagement with gangs a 
political no-go zone. Nevertheless, leading politicians 
from all major political parties have kept on making 
backstage deals with gangs in the years since (Martínez 
2016a and 2018b). Former lawmaker and current Mayor 
of San Salvador Ernesto Muyshondt concedes that “it is a 
reality that this country lives, and if you want to be a pol-
itician in this country … if you want to be a mayor and do 
a job in your municipality …Then you have to deal with 
them to be able to work in the territories” (Labrador and 
Martínez 2016, online). Indeed, this has been the norm 
since the 1990s (Sanz and Martínez 2012).
The Colombian processes mentioned also involved 
nonviolent engagement with organized crime, gangs, 
militias, paramilitaries, and guerrillas, but that context 
of overtly political conflict offered more familiar ways 
to explain this to the public. However, the development 
of a conducive language and political framework for 
engaging with gangs—actors that are usually held to be 
criminal and depoliticized—is extremely challenging. 
The most durable, large-scale experience to this effect 
has been developing in Ecuador since the late 2000s, 
when the country’s principal gangs—the Crazy Souls, 
the Masters of the Street, the Ñetas, and the Sacred 
Tribe Atahualpa Ecuador—embarked on a journey to 
reduce armed violence (Brotherton and Gude 2018). 
Building on an initial gang truce facilitated by police, 
the gangs were incorporated into the decade-long 
political project of President Rafael Correa (Clark and 
García 2019), and the Ecuadorian “citizens’ revolution” 
provided crucial political and social space for the gangs 
to transform themselves—each in their own ways and 
over the course of a decade—into street organizations 
that retain their distinct cultural outlooks and expres-
sions, but leave crime and violence behind (Brotherton 
and Gude 2020).
Conclusion
The calamity of violence in twenty-first century El Sal-
vador was not intended by gangs, governments, or any 
other actor. Rather, it recalls the fundamental sociolog-
ical insight of Norbert Elias (2000, 366), that “the basic 
tissue resulting from many single plans and actions of 
people can give rise to changes and patterns that no 
individual person has planned or created.” For years, 
Salvadoran gangs and governments have been locked 
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into a process of mutually harmful escalation of armed 
violence, even though it is broadly against the interests 
and wishes of everyone involved.
Yet, the years of gang wars and war on gangs has only 
made the challenge of articulating an alternative polit-
ical platform and policy framework to gang repression 
that much more difficult. Between July 23, 2003, when 
President Francisco Flores declared “mano dura” against 
gangs, and December 31, 2019, 61,754 people were mur-
dered in El Salvador, and the dead weigh heavily on 
today’s politics. The immense suffering involved may 
prop up the allure of authoritarianism, but the evidence 
is resounding: This policy has been a disaster and the 
war on gangs must stop.
The most significant reductions in armed violence in 
El Salvador have come about when the gangs have 
mobilized to rein in the wars that they are tangled up 
in—most notably, by way of gang truces in 2012 and 
2016—, demonstrating, as these gangs have repeated in 
numerous joint communiqués over the years, that “just 
as we are part of the problem, we can be part of the solu-
tion.” Clearly, they have the necessary organizational 
capital—for better and for worse. However, any amount 
organizational capital cannot make up for the absence 
of a far broader political project, capable of developing 
strategic links between short-term responses to urgent 
needs and longer-term visions for a society capable of 
dealing with conflicts without violence.
Ultimately, this is a pragmatic approach. It may be 
uncomfortable for many—unsatisfying perhaps—but 
there will be gangs in El Salvador and across the Amer-
icas throughout the rest of this century, no matter 
the policies. Coupled with the tragedy of the first two 
decades of this millennium, this recognition should 
allow us to at least entertain a new set of questions: 
Say, how might we live with the gangs but without the 
violence? That is, might we shift our focus from futile 
attempts to eradicate gangs to more realistic efforts to 
eradicate gang violence?
If previous Salvadoran presidents have been unwilling 
or unable to break with decades of failed gang policies, 
President Bukele at least has the conditions to raise 
a formidable political project. With approval ratings 
above ninety percent, he has a political capital unlike 
any of his predecessors (Margolis 2019). Moreover, in 
the face of the electoral implosion of the country’s tra-
ditional political parties, Bukele’s outfit, New Ideas, is 
set to win the 2021 legislative and municipal elections 
handily, thus consolidating an immense power base. In 
early 2020, though, the political vision and actionable 
policies of this government are still being formed—a 
process that was abruptly put on hold by the coronavi-
rus disease 2019 (COVID-19). Then again, COVID-19 has 
also thrown the ordinary rules of the political game up 
in the air. Maybe, just maybe, it offers an opportunity to 
imagine living together without violence and to strive 
for peace by peaceful means.
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